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Abstract 31 
Dispersal is a key process for the emergence of social and biological behaviours. Yet 32 
far less attention has been paid to the dispersal effects on the evolution of cooperative 33 
behaviour in structured populations. To address this issue, we propose two dispersal 34 
modes, parent-preferred and offspring-preferred dispersal, into the birth-death update 35 
rule, and then consider the update rule with parent-preferred and offspring-preferred 36 
dispersal into evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma on random-regular, small-world, and 37 
scale-free networks, respectively. We find that parent-preferred dispersal favours the 38 
evolution of cooperation in these different types of population structures and 39 
offspring-preferred dispersal inhibits the evolution of cooperation in homogeneous 40 
populations. But in scale-free networks when the parent-preferred dispersal strength is 41 
weak, cooperation is greatly enhanced for intermediate offspring-preferred dispersal 42 
strength, and cooperators can coexist with defectors for strong offspring-preferred 43 
dispersal strength. Moreover, our theoretical analysis precisely predicts the 44 
evolutionary outcomes in random-regular networks. We also incorporate these two 45 
dispersal modes into other three update rules, that is, death-birth, imitation, and 46 
pairwise comparison update rules, respectively, and find that similar results about 47 
effects of parent-preferred and offspring-preferred dispersal can be observed in 48 
different types of population structures. Our work, thus, unveil robust effects of 49 
individual preferential dispersal on the evolution of cooperation in different 50 
interactive environments. 51 
Keywords 52 
prisoner’s dilemma, cooperation, population structures, dispersal, update rule 53 
  54 
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1. Introduction 55 
How to understand the emergence of cooperation among rational individuals is a 56 
central challenge in evolutionary biology as well as social sciences. Evolutionary 57 
game theory provides a common mathematical framework to interpret the evolution 58 
of cooperation [1-3]. In particular, the prisoner’s dilemma game, as a typical example, 59 
has attracted considerable attention [4,5]. The prisoner’s dilemma is traditionally 60 
studied in an infinite, well-mixed population, where all individuals are equally likely 61 
to interact with each other. However, the well-mixed population typically opposes the 62 
evolution of cooperation [6]. 63 
In the past few years, it has been increasingly realized that real populations are 64 
not well-mixed, but structured, which can be well described by some network models, 65 
e.g., small-world [7] and scale-free networks [8]. Many studies show that population 66 
structures can promote cooperation via network reciprocity [9-18]. In particular, 67 
network heterogeneity is identified as the main driving force behind the flourishing 68 
cooperative behavior in scale-free networks [11,12]. However, such positive effects 69 
from network reciprocity do not always hold well for the evolution of cooperation, 70 
even in heterogeneous networks. For example, the advantage of heterogeneous 71 
networks in the evolution of cooperation can be greatly weakened by participation 72 
costs [19] or normalizing the accumulative payoff [20]. The update rule also plays an 73 
important role in the evolution of cooperation in social networks [9,21-23]. 74 
Remarkably, it is found that death-birth update in social networks allows the 75 
evolution of cooperation if the benefit-to-cost ratio in the prisoner’s dilemma exceeds 76 
the average degree of the graph [13]. But surprisingly, under the birth-death update 77 
rule [24] cooperation can be never favoured in different types of network structures 78 
[13]. These findings show that the birth-death update rule can strongly suppress the 79 
favouring factors of network reciprocity for the evolution of cooperation. 80 
Under the original birth-death update rule, a player is chosen for reproduction 81 
from the entire population proportional to fitness, and then the offspring replaces a 82 
random neighbour of the parental player. Such dispersal behaviour of offspring for the 83 
new site will influence the parent’fitness in the game framework, even if the dispersal 84 
model is random and local. Thus how to replace the neighbour site of parental player 85 
may cause the competition between the offspring and the parent when only local 86 
interaction is allowed [25]. Under this competitive scheme, when an individual is 87 
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selected from the entire population proportional to fitness and then engenders an 88 
offspring, the offspring may replace a site of the neighbours according to some 89 
preferential dispersal modes, rather than the random dispersal mode. In this work, we 90 
thereby consider two different local dispersal modes driven by the parent and 91 
offspring respectively [26], that is, parent-preferred dispersal and offspring-preferred 92 
dispersal, and assume that the new location for the offspring under the birth-death 93 
update rule is determined by parent-preferred dispersal and offspring-preferred 94 
dispersal together. On the one hand, under the offspring-preferred dispersal the 95 
offspring prefers to have a favourable interactive environment after leaving for the 96 
new site [27]. Whereas, on the other hand, under the parent-preferred dispersal the 97 
parent prefers to improve or maintain its own interactive environment through the 98 
offspring’s replacing. This may correspond to the phenomenon that, for example, in 99 
the animal world young and male lions are abandoned or ostracized from the group, in 100 
order to hold the predominance and reduce the competition from future generations 101 
[28]. 102 
In this paper, we incorporate such two preferential dispersal modes 103 
simultaneously into the birth-death update rule in structured populations, where 104 
individuals can have some information about their surrounding environments. We 105 
assume that individuals can not only easily observe the information about their nearest 106 
neighbours, but also obtain the information about other individuals through their close 107 
friends in a social manner since most of individuals can only have local information 108 
about others in realistic networked systems [29,30]. Based on the local information 109 
the parent and identical offspring can inspect the environments around the new 110 
locations. And the potential gains of the parent and offspring after the offspring’s 111 
replacing could thus be set as two quantities for parent-preferred and 112 
offspring-preferred dispersal, which can characterize the surrounding interaction 113 
environments for the parent and offspring, respectively. Accordingly, the new 114 
location for the offspring can be determined in combination with these quantities. 115 
In this work, we then study how the dispersal rule based on parent-preferred 116 
and offspring-preferred dispersal affects the evolution of cooperation in different 117 
types of population structures including random-regular [31], small-world, and 118 
scale-free networks. Also, we develop the pair-approximation method for some 119 
theoretical analysis on regular networks. We find that parent-preferred dispersal can 120 
always favour the evolution of cooperation in different types of social networks. In 121 
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addition, offspring-preferred dispersal inhibits the evolution of cooperation in 122 
homogeneous networks, whereas in heterogeneous networks there exists an 123 
intermediate offspring-preferred dispersal strength at which cooperators can be 124 
promoted for weak parent-preferred dispersal strength. We also explicitly incorporate 125 
parent-preferred and offspring-preferred dispersal modes into other three strategy 126 
update rules including death-birth, imitation, and pairwise comparison update rules 127 
[32-37], and find that our main results about effects of parent-preferred and 128 
offspring-preferred dispersal hold against the changes of the update rules. 129 
2. Model 130 
We consider the evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game in structured populations. 131 
Following previous study [5], we adopt the game’s payoff matrix as 132 
	 =  −  − 0 	, 
where  represents the benefit of cooperation, and  (0 <  < ) represents the cost 133 
of cooperation. 134 
Initially, each player  is designated to play either as a cooperator () or as 135 
defector (), and occupies one node of the network. At each time step, each player  136 
engages in pairwise interactions with all its adjacent neighbours, and then collects its 137 
payoff  based on the payoff matrix parameters. Furthermore, player  obtains its 138 
fitness associated with the payoff information, given as [38]  139 
 =  , 
where  > 0  is the intensity of selection. In our present study, we adopt the 140 
exponential function of fitness so that each individual’s fitness is always positive. In 141 
order to avoid amplifying the fitness difference among the population under this 142 
exponential function, in the main context we simply set  = 0.01. 143 
After playing the games, individual  is chosen for reproduction proportional 144 
to its fitness. In other words, individual  is selected with probability / for 145 
reproduction, where  = ∑   denotes the total amount of fitness in the population. 146 
We assume that individual  reproduces an identical offspring , and only has 147 
local information about its nearest and next-nearest neighbours. Hence, parent  can 148 
obtain its expected fitness and its offspring’s expected fitness when one site in its 149 
neighbourhood is chosen for its offspring . In combination with these expected 150 
fitness information, the selection probability of offspring  replacing one of the 151 
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neighbours  is set as 152 
 →" =
($  →%)
'($ →()
)
∑ ($  →*)
'($ →*)
)*∈,
	, 153 
where the sum is over all the neighbours of ,   →(denotes the expected fitness of 154 
offspring  when  occupies the site of player ,  →(  denotes the expected 155 
fitness of parent   when   occupies the site of player  , - > 0 denotes the 156 
offspring-preferred dispersal strength, and . > 0  denotes the parent-preferred 157 
dispersal strength. In particular, for - = 0 and . = 0 the offspring will replace a 158 
random neighbour of player  , and in this case the original birth-death rule is 159 
considered [13]. 160 
In this study, we focus on the effects of -  and .  on the evolution of 161 
cooperation in three different types of population structures, including random-regular, 162 
small-world, and scale-free networks. Instead of the fixation probability of 163 
cooperation, the key quantity for characterizing the cooperative behaviour of the 164 
population is the density of cooperators, which is defined as the fraction of 165 
cooperators in the population. We use individual-based simulations as well as the 166 
pair-approximation method to perform this study. 167 
Simulations are carried out in a population with the size / = 1000. The 168 
average number of neighbours in each network model (including random-regular, 169 
small-world, and scale-free networks) is set to 4. We implement the simulation with 170 
asynchronous update [14,39]. Initially, the two strategies of  and  are randomly 171 
distributed among the population with an equal probability 0.5. Under stochastic 172 
dynamics, the population will converge to one of the two possible absorbing states: 173 
full cooperation or full defection [29]. We run 102 independent realizations for each 174 
set of parameter values, and compute the fraction of times that the system evolves to 175 
full cooperation as the density of cooperators [27,32]. However, if the population does 176 
not converge to an absorbing state after 5 × 104 generations, the cooperation level is 177 
determined by the average fraction of cooperators in the population over the last 178 
2 × 106 generations. 179 
3. Results 180 
First, we incorporate the proposed offspring-preferred and parent-preferred dispersal 181 
modes into the birth-death update rule, and respectively show the fraction of 182 
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cooperators depending on - and . together in random-regular, small-world, and 183 
scale-free networks, as plotted in figure 1. We see that in random-regular and 184 
small-world networks the cooperation level dramatically decreases as the 185 
offspring-preferred dispersal -  increases, whereas intensively increases as the 186 
parent-preferred dispersal . increases (figure 1a and 1b). Moreover, full defection 187 
can be easily achieved for strong offspring-preferred dispersal strength and weak 188 
parent-preferred dispersal strength, whereas full cooperation can be easily achieved 189 
for weak offspring-preferred dispersal strength and strong parent-preferred dispersal 190 
strength. However, in scale-free networks, the cooperation level monotonically 191 
increases with increasing the parent-preferred dispersal strength .  for fixed - 192 
(figure 1c). For larger fixed values of ., the cooperation level gradually decreases 193 
with increasing the offspring-preferred dispersal -. Surprisingly, for smaller fixed 194 
values of .  (e.g., . = 1), the cooperation level first increases from zero until 195 
reaching the maximum value, and then decreases with increasing -. It means that for 196 
small values of ., there exists an intermediate value of -, which can results in the 197 
optimal cooperation level in scale-free networks. In addition, the cooperation level is 198 
not very low when the value of - becomes large, indicating that cooperators can 199 
coexist with defectors. 200 
In figure 2, we provide the theoretical results by pair-approximation method in 201 
regular networks (for details see electronic supplementary material). By comparison, 202 
we find that theoretical analysis agrees well with numerical simulations in 203 
random-regular networks, as shown in figure 1a. However, this theoretical method 204 
cannot well predict simulation results in other types of networks, especially in 205 
scale-free networks. Here, we do not provide the theoretical results by the extended 206 
pair-approximation method considering the clustering effect and degree fluctuation 207 
[13,40]. Despite this point, our present theoretical analysis qualitatively reflects the 208 
roles of parent-preferred dispersal and offspring-preferred dispersal in the evolution of 209 
cooperation in structured populations. 210 
What is the origin of such a boost of cooperation by the parent-preferred 211 
dispersal mode in different types of networks? In fact, when a defector is chosen for 212 
reproduction, it implies that this defector has a higher fitness and is surrounded by 213 
some cooperators. Under the parent-preferred dispersal, the defective parent prefers to 214 
let the offspring replace a defective neighbour’s site, rather than a cooperative 215 
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neighbour’s. In this situation, although the parent can keep having a higher fitness, the 216 
spreading of defective behaviour is inhibited in the population (figure 3a). Moreover, 217 
in the initial conditions of 50% cooperators and for weak selection, cooperators can 218 
also have the opportunity to be chosen for reproduction in these types of population 219 
structures, especially in scale-free networks. When a cooperator is chosen for 220 
reproduction, it implies that the cooperator should directly connect more cooperative 221 
neighbours than others. Under the parent-preferred dispersal, if the cooperative parent 222 
also directly connects some defectors, the offspring prefers to replace the defective 223 
site so that the parent can have a higher fitness. On the one hand, such replacement 224 
can expand the cooperators’ clusters, and the cooperative behaviour is spreading 225 
(figure 3a). On the other hand, it leads to a positive feedback mechanism, so that 226 
cooperators in the population can have more opportunities to be chosen for 227 
reproduction. Consequently, cooperative behaviour can evolve and prevail in 228 
structured populations. 229 
Why does the offspring-preferred dispersal inhibit the evolution of 230 
cooperation in random-regular and small-world networks? In fact, under the 231 
offspring-preferred dispersal, when a defector is chosen for reproduction, the 232 
offspring prefers to choose a neighbour who is connecting more cooperators. 233 
Accordingly, this defective offspring replaces a cooperative neighbour of the parent. 234 
This is because that the cooperative neighbour often connects other cooperators under 235 
the birth-death rule without mutation, and it has the same (similar) number of 236 
interacting neighbours to others’ in random-regular (small-world) networks. 237 
Correspondingly, the defective offspring can have a higher fitness, but the defective 238 
behaviour is spreading in the population (figure 3b). On the other hand, when a 239 
cooperator is chosen for reproduction, the offspring prefers to take over a cooperative 240 
neighbour of its parent so that the offspring can have a higher fitness in 241 
random-regular and small-world networks. However, such replacing for its offspring 242 
is unfavourable to the expansion of cooperators’ cluster, and hence the spreading of 243 
the cooperative behaviour in the population is slow and stagnated (figure 3b). 244 
It still remains to explain why cooperators can survive in scale-free networks 245 
under the strong offspring-preferred dispersal. To do this, we investigate the time 246 
evolution of bias in distribution of cooperators across degree number in scale-free 247 
networks. as shown in figure 4. We define the distribution bias for each time step 8 248 
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as sign=>(8)?1/(1 + 1/|>(8)|) , where >(8) = =Bc>(8) − Bc(8)?/Bc(8) . Here, 249 
Bc(8) represents the total fraction of cooperation at time 8, and Bc>(8) represents the 250 
fraction of cooperators on nodes with degree D at time 8. 251 
We find that for weak offspring-preferred strength, as time increases the 252 
fractions of cooperators on high-degree and middle-degree nodes first becomes 253 
smaller than the total fraction of cooperation in the whole population (figure 4a). Thus, 254 
cooperation cannot evolve in this situation. For moderate offspring-preferred dispersal 255 
strength, as time increases the fractions of cooperators on high-degree and 256 
middle-degree nodes becomes higher than the total fraction of cooperation in the 257 
whole population, which induces a positive feedback mechanism for the evolution of 258 
cooperation (figure 4b). For strong offspring-preferred dispersal strength, as time 259 
increases there are always some fluctuations of distribution bias of cooperators on 260 
high-degree and middle-degree nodes (figure 4c). Hence, cooperators cannot stably 261 
dominate the high-degree nodes, which indeed play a crucial role in the emergence of 262 
cooperation in scale-free networks [11]. However, in this situation cooperators can 263 
coexist with defectors for a long time. This is because that in scale-free networks 264 
individuals occupying high-degree nodes can be easily chosen for reproduction. When 265 
a D-hub is chosen, its offspring prefers to move the site of one nearest neighbour with 266 
high-degree number for strong offspring-preferred dispersal strength. This induces a 267 
negative feedback mechanism that reduces their fitness and the opportunity of being 268 
chosen for reproduction. When a C-hub is chosen, its offspring prefers to move the 269 
site of one nearest neighbour with high-degree number for strong offspring-preferred 270 
dispersal strength. Moreover, for strong offspring-preferred dispersal strength the 271 
cooperative offspring always prefers to choose the high-degree nodes for replacing. 272 
This does not facilitate the expanding of cooperator clusters in the networks. However, 273 
cooperators can still coexist with defectors in this situation. On the contrary, under 274 
relatively weaker offspring-preferred dispersal strength the cooperative offspring may 275 
prefer to choose the site with other degree classes for replacing, which is helpful to 276 
the spreading of cooperative strategy. Consequently, cooperative behaviour can 277 
dominate the whole population. 278 
Finally, it is of interest to elaborate on the generality of the effectiveness of 279 
offspring-preferred and parent-preferred dispersal for the evolution of cooperation. To 280 
do so, we further incorporate explicitly the offspring-preferred and parent-preferred 281 
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dispersal modes into other three update rules, that is, death-birth, imitation, and 282 
pairwise comparison update rules, respectively (for detailed description see electronic 283 
supplementary material). We still find that under these three different update rules the 284 
parent-preferred dispersal approach can promote the evolution of cooperation in 285 
different types of population structures, and in scale-free networks cooperation can be 286 
still enhanced by an intermediate value of offspring-preferred dispersal strength when 287 
the parent-preferred dispersal strength is not high (electronic supplementary material, 288 
figure S2). However, together with figure 1, we can further find that under the 289 
birth-death update rule a favourable cooperation level can be achieved in a wider 290 
parameter range in comparison with the results for other three update rules. 291 
Noticeably, full cooperation can only be realized in a relatively narrow parameter 292 
range under the pairwise comparison update rule, since the intensity of selection also 293 
influences the evolutionary outcome of cooperation [14]. 294 
4. Discussion 295 
In this work, we have proposed two dispersal modes simultaneously into the 296 
birth-death update rule, and shown that parent-preferred dispersal favours cooperation 297 
to evolve in different types of population structures. Thus, our results indicate that 298 
when some competition exists between the parent and its offspring in structured 299 
populations, cooperative behaviour can thrive if the parent is more self-interested. 300 
Moreover, we have found that offspring-preferred dispersal often inhibits the 301 
evolution of cooperation in homogeneous networks. While for strong 302 
offspring-preferred dispersal cooperators can coexist with defectors for a long time in 303 
a heterogeneous population. And, compared with the case without offspring-preferred 304 
dispersal or parent-preferred dispersal in scale-free networks cooperation is still 305 
promoted by the introduction of offspring-preferred dispersal in scale-free networks 306 
(electronic supplementary material, figure S1). Our work highlights the importance of 307 
dispersal rule to the evolution of cooperation in structured populations. 308 
Our dispersal rule is one mode of local migration or mobility for individuals, 309 
but is different from the ones often studied on a square lattice [41-46]. In the 310 
traditional framework of migration, only the focal individual moves into an empty site 311 
from an occupied one if needed, so that the spatial interactions and the number of 312 
interactive individuals are both influenced, and even individuals can become isolated. 313 
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Such spatial dispersal has been considered into evolutionary games for studying the 314 
evolution of cooperation [41-44] and the evolving biodiversity [45,46]. Whereas in 315 
our study we propose two different dispersal modes and simultaneously incorporate 316 
them into different types of population structures. Under our dispersal rule, only the 317 
offspring individual replaces the site of the neighbouring individual who is chosen to 318 
be dead. Hence the empty site in our study is temporary. Moreover, previous study 319 
found that when individuals move into a favourable environment for cooperation, 320 
cooperation can prevail even in a noise condition [44]. However, in our framework 321 
we find that when an offspring individual moves into a favourable interactive 322 
environment for itself, cooperation cannot evolve in homogeneous populations. 323 
Instead, when the offspring individual moves into a favourable interaction 324 
environment for its parent, cooperation can flourish in structured populations. In fact, 325 
under the birth-death update rule with random dispersal, cooperation can be never 326 
favoured in structured populations [13]. Thus, in a sense our work extends the local 327 
dispersal rule into different types of structured populations from the spatially 328 
structured populations, and enriches the knowledge of local dispersal’s effects on the 329 
evolution of cooperation in structured populations. 330 
Our dispersal approach is simultaneously driven by both the parent’s and 331 
offspring’s preferences. And, dispersal competition exists between them, and such 332 
kin-like competition works as the driver determining the final dispersal site of the 333 
offspring. Here, we compare the relative contribution of parent-preferred and 334 
offspring-preferred dispersal to the evolution of cooperation. Intuitively, cooperation 335 
could be favourable under the strong offspring-preferred dispersal. This is because 336 
that the parental individual may sacrifice its own interests for maximizing its 337 
offspring’s benefit in structured populations, leading to the emergence of kin selection 338 
[6]. However, surprisingly we find that the parent-preferred dispersal can favour the 339 
evolution of cooperation in different types of population structures, compared with the 340 
offspring-preferred dispersal. Although cooperators can coexist with defectors in 341 
scale-free networks for strong offspring-preferred dispersal strength, this result 342 
depends on the topology features of scale-free networks. 343 
We set that initially cooperators randomly occupy 50%  of the sites of 344 
individuals in the population, rather than only one cooperator like Ref. [13]. In fact, in 345 
that harsh initial condition, the only one cooperator is chosen for reproduction with an 346 
extremely small probability in scale-free network with large population size (e.g., 347 
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/ = 1000) in some simulation realizations. Conversely, the cooperator could be 348 
replaced by the defective offspring with a higher probability even under strong 349 
parent-preferred dispersal. Hence this initial condition can greatly diminish the 350 
positive effects induced by strong parent-preferred dispersal. Correspondingly, we 351 
consider that cooperators and defectors are equally distributed on the population 352 
structure as the initial condition in our study as previous works did [11,12]. In 353 
addition, we use the fraction of cooperators as the key quantity instead of the fixation 354 
probability of cooperation. This is because that we find that cooperators can coexist 355 
with defectors for a long time in scale-free network under some parameter settings 356 
(figure 1c), even if initially half the players are cooperators. Furthermore, we only 357 
provide the theoretical results by the pair-approximation method for regular graphs in 358 
this work. In fact, there are some improved pair-approximation approaches by 359 
considering the clustering effect and degree fluctuation [40,47], which can be used to 360 
predict our evolutionary outcomes in scale-free networks. Thus, it is worth using these 361 
approaches or further developing precise analytical tools to confirm our simulation 362 
results in scale-free networks in the future [48]. 363 
In this work, we consider that the parent only has the local information of its 364 
nearest and next-nearest neighbours, and the offspring can only replace one site of the 365 
parent’s nearest neighbours. That is to say, nearest-neighbour dispersal mode is used. 366 
In fact, individuals may have the information of more neighbours in the population, 367 
and they can move into distant sites in the population. If there are more placements 368 
for dispersal, both the defective parent and offspring do not prefer that the offspring 369 
moves to the nearest sites. And both cooperators and defectors prefer that they are 370 
surrounded by more layers of cooperators when the distant dispersal mode is 371 
considered. In this extended framework, it is worth studying how the non-local 372 
parent-preferred and offspring-preferred dispersal modes are implemented in 373 
structured populations and how they influence the evolution of cooperation in 374 
structured populations. In addition, we do not include the effects of behavioural 375 
mutation [37] or imitation errors [49] in the present study. For example, when an 376 
individual is chosen for reproduction, mutation may occur on the offspring with a 377 
probability. And stochastic effects arising from different sorts of errors may play an 378 
important role in the cooperative behaviour at a population level. Thus, an interesting 379 
extension is to examine the robustness of our results in the presence of mutation 380 
errors. 381 
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Figures and Captions 547 
 548 
 549 
 550 
Figure 1: Fraction of cooperators depending on offspring-preferred dispersal strength 551 
- and parent-preferred dispersal strength . in a contour plot form in random-regular 552 
(a), small-world (b), and scale-free (c) networks, respectively. Parent-preferred 553 
dispersal favours the evolution of cooperation in different types of population 554 
structures. In scale-free networks, cooperators can coexist with defectors under strong 555 
offspring-preferred dispersal strength. Here,  = 0.01 and / = 4. 556 
 557 
 558 
Figure 2: Theoretical analysis by pair-approximation method in regular networks 559 
depending on the offspring-preferred dispersal strength -  and parent-preferred 560 
dispersal strength .  in a contour plot. The analysis precisely predicts the 561 
evolutionary outcomes in random-regular networks. 562 
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 563 
 564 
Figure 3: Intuitive illustrations for microscopic evolution in homogeneous networks. 565 
We consider a cooperator-defector pair competing for the next reproduction event. 566 
The defector with payoff 2 has a great advantage to be chosen for reproduction. 567 
However, its left cooperative neighbour with payoff 2 − 4  can have the 568 
opportunity to be chosen for reproduction under the proportional birth rule and for 569 
weak selection. (a) Under the parent-preferred dispersal, the offspring of the focal 570 
defector prefers to replace a neighbouring defector; which induces a positive feedback 571 
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mechanism for the expanding of cooperator clusters. (b) Under the offspring-preferred 572 
dispersal, the offspring of the focal defector prefers to replace the site of the focal 573 
cooperator, leading to the expanding of defectors, whereas the offspring of the focal 574 
cooperator prefers to replace a cooperative neighbour. 575 
 576 
 577 
Figure 4: Time evolution of bias in distribution of cooperators across degree number 578 
in scale-free networks for weak parent-preferred dispersal strength . = 1  and 579 
different values of offspring-preferred dispersal strength: (a) - = 1, (b) - = 3, and (c) 580 
- = 6. The distribution bias for each time step 8 is computed as sign=>(8)?1/(1 +581 
1/|>(8)|) , where D(8) = GBcD(8) − Bc(8)H/Bc(8) . Here, Bc(8)  represents the total 582 
fraction of cooperation at time 8, and BcD(8) represents the fraction of cooperators on 583 
nodes with degree D at time 8. (d) describes the degree distribution of scale-free with 584 
average degree number D = 4 and population size / = 1000. In the networks, there 585 
are 70% nodes whose degree number is not larger than 3, and 90% nodes whose 586 
degree number is not larger than 6. Here,  = 0.01 and  = 4. 587 
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